Zion and the Art of Armageddon

Israel has killed more than 13,000 children in Gaza since October 7 while others are suffering from severe malnutrition and do not “even have the energy to cry”, says the United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF).

Alexandra Saieh, head of humanitarian policy and advocacy at Save the Children International, said the official number of children who have died of malnutrition amid a growing famine in Gaza likely under-represents the true scale of the tragedy.


Having previously reported that 9,500 women and 14,500 children had died during the war (some 69% of all fatalities), OCHA is now reporting far lower numbers, stating that among “identified” deaths, 4,959 women have died, along with 7,797 children (or 52% of the total number of identified deaths in the war).

Of note, the Hamas ministry counts all those under the age of 18 as children, while commentators note that a not-insignificant number of combatants are in their teens.
 
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The new figures were 7,797 children and 4,959 women killed and subsequently identified. OCHA did not change its overall estimate that more than 34,900 Palestinians have died.

pick the bones out of the rubble. Then y'all can play the numbers game.
 
pick the bones out of the rubble. Then y'all can play the numbers game.
Israel's apologists only care about playing a numbers game when it suits their support of the undoubted indiscriminate mass slaughter and almost medieval siege tactics that is taking place!
 
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Of note, the Hamas ministry counts all those under the age of 18 as children
They are. An extract
The data now differentiates between the total number of deaths reported by Hamas (over 34,000) and the number of “identified” fatalities (over 24,000).
I love the over 24,000 because this area has been mentioned before. OCHA take figures directly from the Gaza hospitals. They identify the body when it arrives. That is one of the figures. The other is an estimate based on number of people in a building when it's hit less survivors. As bodies are under the rubble they can not be identified individually. Much like the world over a body is needed to be able to legally state they are dead. The others could just be regarded as missing.

Fact is no UN agency has downgraded the figures. Israel has just tried to via the article. Lied in terms of they have downgraded the numbers. They haven't.

The highest number I have heard is 7,000 that fit in with the missing numbers. That is the max error if none died this way. None - are you kidding when houses and flat blocks are bombed when there are likely to be max number of people in them.

The other aspect is the current hospital situation in the strip. The Israeli ICJ lady says fine which does not tie in with reports from visiting docs from a whole variety of countries. She also suggested a field hospital is as capable as a proper one. Reports on those suggest NGO run with limited facilities. These always have a need to be able to transfer people to real ones.
 
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Israel's apologists only care about playing a numbers game when it suits their support of the undoubted indiscriminate mass slaughter and almost medieval siege tactics that is taking place!
It's a zero sum game. Who is winning?
 
Daily death counts of late are lower than they have been in the past. A number of attacks are repeats so some changes in this area can be expected.

Aid. The floating pier is operational. They think it can be stepped up to 90 trucks a day which is way short so land corridors are still needed. Cheaper and more convenient. The US still says these corridors need to be opened. It's not clear which ones are. The S ones aren't. The Kuwait hospital still seems to be operational despite Israel saying evacuate it.
 
Daily death counts of late are lower than they have been in the past. A number of attacks are repeats so some changes in this area can be expected.

Aid. The floating pier is operational. They think it can be stepped up to 90 trucks a day which is way short so land corridors are still needed. Cheaper and more convenient. The US still says these corridors need to be opened. It's not clear which ones are. The S ones aren't. The Kuwait hospital still seems to be operational despite Israel saying evacuate it.
The floating pier is a complete waste of time.

It'll be manned by the IDF who will simply refuse to let any goods through. The only advantage is that there won't be any Israeli civilians destroying the aid whilst it waits to be processed.

Plus it's 500m from an IDF firebase, so any civilians or NGOs trying to collect food will be at risk.

There are no technical challenges to getting food into Gaza, it's all down to policy and choice.
 
It'll be manned by the IDF who will simply refuse to let any goods through
They are doing the driving to the shore where it is then loaded on trucks to get it where ever it's going.

However the US mentioned the first trip was a test that went ok. The question is can it really and reliably reach 90/day. Fairly safe to assume the ships can do it. The transport??? It's number that just helps rather than fixes.

;) Apart from that I agree. I'll add a bit.
No metal - hamas might use it so no tins. No wood so no crates, same reasons, No dates due to the stones - think of David and his sling.

I think those have been "fixed". However the other one is opening hours if and when they are open. It's been a variable all along and does interfere with flow,
 
They are. An extract
The data now differentiates between the total number of deaths reported by Hamas (over 34,000) and the number of “identified” fatalities (over 24,000).
I love the over 24,000 because this area has been mentioned before. OCHA take figures directly from the Gaza hospitals. They identify the body when it arrives. That is one of the figures. The other is an estimate based on number of people in a building when it's hit less survivors. As bodies are under the rubble they can not be identified individually. Much like the world over a body is needed to be able to legally state they are dead. The others could just be regarded as missing.

Fact is no UN agency has downgraded the figures. Israel has just tried to via the article. Lied in terms of they have downgraded the numbers. They haven't.

The revised figures lend more credence to the number of combatants killed by the IDF, of course they still don't take into account the number of Palestinians killed by the 1000 or so failed Hamas rocket launches.
 
;) Apart from that I agree. I'll add a bit.
No metal - hamas might use it so no tins. No wood so no crates, same reasons, No dates due to the stones - think of David and his sling.

Sounds like you're quite keen on Hamas bringing in weapons, why?
 
Benny and the Fascists are revolting.
Well yeah, to state the obvious, but his threat to quit the war cabinet coming after the murder minister openly slated his glorious fuhrer's war strategy has exposed deep divisions in the Fascist lair.


It means ‘vengeance’ or ‘revenge’ in Hebrew and has emerged as one of the key words in Israeli public life. We’ve heard discussion of nekama from the government, the Knesset, the media, the army, social networks, synagogue bulletins, and in popular culture...In the past few months, there were many poems on revenge written by Israelis, some of them IDF soldiers.

Revenge has a distinctive and dynamic relationship to time: it is caused by an act of wrong that happened in the past as an explanation for the present moment, but it is also directed towards the future. Austin Sarat, a scholar of law and politics, explains that vengeance attempts, consciously or not, to reenact the past, as it is ‘one means by which the present speaks to the future through acts of commemoration’. The fact that vengeance looks backwards and seeks to cancel out past actions is one reason why the relationship between revenge and justice is complex. Revenge can indeed be the opposite of justice, a product of utter despair, a kind of empty and final gesture toward restoring one’s shattered self-respect...there is an understanding that ‘revenge is a kind of wild justice,’ as Francis Bacon wrote in his essay ‘Of Revenge’ (1625).

Most modern systems of law claim authority by distinguishing themselves from revenge, though conceding that feelings for revenge cannot be eradicated. Scholars of politics and law seem to agree that there is no place for revenge in modern international relations. Here too, however, as the scholar Jon Elster has shown, revenge persists, often concealed under more technical and dispassionate terminology about state or national interests.

Jewish sources give us many, sometimes contradictory, voices on nekama. Many biblical texts prohibit vengeance by human hands, as well as collective Jewish vengeance, although there is an exceptional case of revenge against the people of Amalek, biblical enemies of the Israelites. In post-biblical work, vengeance assumes the form of a divine promise that the redemption of the people of Israel will come to fruition when God enacts revenge upon their enemies. This version of nekama is a kind of eschatological prophecy. The only act of vengeance in the Bible with some elements of the noble, albeit dangerous, tragic revenge we find in the classical Greek literature, is the story of Samson in the book of Judges avenging himself on the Philistines in ancient Gaza. It is not a surprise that some of the poems and popular songs about revenge are focused on Samson.
 
In an important 1996 paper, the American Jewish philosopher Berel Lang asked: what is vengeance and revenge in Jewish consciousness worldwide? What about in the Yishuv (the Jewish community in pre-state Palestine), during and after the Holocaust?

By the end of the Second World War, writing about vengeance in Hebrew had taken on a new significance. A million and a half Jews fought in the armies of the Allied Powers. Writing in Hebrew, however, focused on the 30,000 Jews from the Yishuv who volunteered to fight alongside the British army, especially the Jewish Brigade, numbering about 5,000 men. The Brigade fought on the Italian front in March-May 1945, but most of its activity followed the war. Its significance lay in the fact that the language, flag, symbols and anthem of the Jewish Brigade were Hebrew. Brigade people were active in the paramilitary units of the Haganah and Palmach.

In 1945, Jewish Brigade soldiers met for the first time in northern Italy with people of the She’erit Ha-pletah (‘the Surviving Remnant’), Holocaust survivors and refugees, as well as partisans and ghetto fighters. Some of the She’erit Ha-pletah had been active in Zionist youth movements even before the war. Kovner had just gathered in Lublin, Poland, about 50 young men and women who had a burning desire to take revenge against not only the Nazis but the entire German people. The details that captivate the imagination of many in the story of Kovner and the Avengers – ‘Plan A’, the killing of 6 million Germans by poisoning the water supply of major German cities, and ‘Plan B’, the killing of SS officers and Gestapo officials who were imprisoned in prisoner camps – are less important. More significantly, Kovner stands as a bridge between Holocaust survivors, most of whom spoke, read and wrote in Yiddish, and people from the Brigade, who represented the Hebrew Zionist Yishuv. It is the latter who shaped the ethos of the State of Israel, and some of whom later served in senior roles in the IDF and Israel’s security apparatus. This is a significant shift towards revenge as part of the Zionist discourse of military power in the context of conflict with Arabs in Palestine in the years around 1948 and the establishment of the State of Israel.

As the scholar Uri S Cohen has shown, in the struggle with the Palestinians and Arab states, Hebrew writers and poets, mostly men born in Palestine and known as the Palmach Generation, wrote a great deal about revenge. For example, the novelist Moshe Shamir wrote a series of novels between 1947 and 1951, each featuring a theme of personal and collective revenge, not against the Nazis or Germans, but against Palestinian Arabs. The desire for revenge against Palestinians during the 1948 war coincided with an important transition away from militias such as the Palmach, towards a regular Israeli army. Revenge became a central part of Hebrew militia culture...revenge against the Arabs served as the emotional core of the literature of the 1948 war. During ‘Israel’s border wars’, between 1949 and 1956, which were essentially a chain of ‘reprisal operations’ dominated by the Commando Unit 101, vengeance remained a driving force. From these conflicts emerged well-known fighters who loomed large in the Israeli and Jewish public imagination, including Ariel Sharon and Meir Har Zion.

Kovner is many things, a historical and political figure, a writer, but he is also a symbolic and transitional figure because his words and actions during the 1948 war show a profound change: the transition from revenge as a response to the Nazis and Germans to revenge against Arabs. As Netiva Ben-Yehuda, an Israeli author, editor and radio broadcaster who was a commander in the Palmach, wrote years after about the 1948 war: ‘We fixed our guns on the Arabs, we pulled the trigger … and we imagined to kill Nazis.’

For Lang, the displacement ‘at one farther remove’ of revenge against Nazis or Germans onto Arabs was ‘a form of demonisation and aggression’. Lang maintained that it could not be accounted for by the real threats Israel had faced, and that it required ‘disfigured representations’ of Arabs. In its people’s ‘emergence from [the] powerlessness’ of the Holocaust, the State of Israel had found in the Arabs an ‘available target’ for revenge. The Israeli psychologist Dan Bar-On, who for many years studied the relations between Israelis, Germans and Palestinians, suggested that the desire for revenge had found an outlet against another group that was causing feelings of threat: the Palestinians, who are perceived as ‘the natural continuation of the previous aggressor’.
 
By the end of the 1948 war, hundreds of thousands of Palestinians became refugees, mostly fleeing to nearby Arab countries. The armistice agreements between Israel and its neighbours drew the new borders for the State of Israel, but violent incidents around these borders were quite common. In October 1953, members of an Arab paramilitary commando group killed a Jewish family in the town of Yehud, which had been depopulated of its Palestinian residents in the 1948 war. Before the ‘reprisal operation’ that occurred after the attack on Jews, Sharon, as commander of Unit 101, wrote in the operation’s orders that the objective was an ‘attack on the village of Qibya, its temporary conquest, and maximum damage to the population with the aim of evacuating the villagers from their homes … by damaging a number of houses and killing residents and soldiers in the village’. Although Sharon’s comment does not mention the word nekama, it must be understood as a vengeful act that became part of the norms for Unit 101. During the operation, IDF soldiers blew up 45 houses in the village with their occupants, and 69 residents of Qibya, mostly women and children, were killed. Many Yiddish writers were shocked and responded to the massacre. In a New York Yiddish journal in 1964, Glatstein wrote about Jewish revenge against the Nazis and Germans in 1944, is furious about the Israeli displacement of vengeance....

...we must acknowledge that vengeance is a human emotion, and it is inescapable – not an alien element, but rather a part of modern Jewish culture. Second, vengeance may lead to collective memory as well as to a cycle of bloodshed. We observed the historical displacement of a desire for vengeance against Nazi Germans, mostly expressed in Yiddish during and after the Second World War, for revenge against Palestinian Arabs, mostly expressed in Hebrew and in Israel around and after 1948. This displacement has existed ever since then and has played an important role in the conflict between Israelis and Palestinians. It was activated most forcefully on 7 October 2023, because of the unprecedented violence of the attack on southern Israel, and the extreme vulnerability of Israeli Jews who sensed that the State of Israel and its army failed in its most basic function, to defend its citizens. This activation of vulnerability is, in no small part, due to the intergenerational collective trauma of the experience of the Holocaust. Because of the displacement of modern Jewish vengeance from Europe onto the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, the vengeful war taking place since 7 October is even more dangerous and tragic. To begin imagining a better future for both Israelis and Palestinians, it is imperative to be more aware of this cultural history with its memories, traumas and numerous blind spots.
 
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